Reliability and Risk Assesment
İÇİNDEKİLERChapter 1 An Introduction to Reliability and RiskAssessment 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Quantified reliability 1.3 Reliability terminology 1.3.1 Reliability 1.3.2 Availability 1.3.3 Unrevealed failures 1.4 Reliability programmes 1.5 Quantified risk assessment 1.5.1 Background 1.5.2 Occupational risks 1.5.3 Community risks 1.6 Risk assessment studies 1.7 Reliability in risk assessment 1.7.1 Fault trees 1.7.2 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 1.8 Risk ranking 1.9 Summary 1.10 References Chapter 2 Reliability Mathematics 2.1 Probability theory 2.1.1 Empirical or experimental probability 2.1.2 Sample size 2.1.3 Theoretical probability 2.1.4 Mutually exclusive events 2.1.5 Non-mutually exclusive events 2.1.6 The addition law of probability 2.1.7 Independent events 2.1,8 Dependent events 2.1.9 Multiplication law of probability 2.1.10 Conditional probability 2.1.11 Binomial distribution 2.1.12 Poisson distribution 2.1.13 Continuous probability distributions 2.1.14 Normal distribution 2.1.15 Log-normal distribution 2.1.16 Negative exponential distribution 2.1.17 Weibull distribution 2.2 Set theory 2.2.1 Notation 2.2.2 Venn diagrams 2.2.3 Operations on a set 2.2.4 Probability and Venn diagrams 2.3 Boolean algebra 2.3.1 AORB 2.3.2 AANDB 2.3.3 NOT .4 2.3.4 Rules of Boolean algebra 2.4 Summary 2.5 Bibliography Chapter 3 Qualitative Methods 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Hazard analysis 3.3 Checklists 3.4 Hazard and operability studies 3.4.1 HAZOP methodology 3.4.2 The HAZOP team 3.4.3 The HAZOP study 3.5 Rapid ranking 3.6 Preliminary hazard analysis 3.7 Reliability and maintainability screening 3.8 Summary 3.9 References Chapter 4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Procedure for performing an FMEA/FMECA 4.2.1 System definition 4.2.2 Block diagrams 4.2.3 Assumptions 4.2.4 Reliability data 4.2.5 FMEA worksheets 4.3 Criticality analysis 4.4 Functional and hardware FMEA/FMECA examples 4.4.1 General 4.4.2 System definition 4.4.3 Block diagrams 4.4.4 Assumptions 4.4.5 Reliability data 4.4.6 Functional FMEA/FMECA worksheets 4.5 Multi-criteria Pareto ranking 4.6 Common cause screening 4.7 Matrix method 4.8 Risk priority number method of FMECA 4.9 Fuzzy logic prioritization of failures 4.10 Generic parts count 4.11 Summary 4.12 References Chapter 5 Quantification of Component Failure Probabilities 5.1 Introduction 5.1.1 Availability 5.1.2 Reliability 5.2 The failure process 5.2.1 Mean time to failure 5.2.2 Failure data example 5.3 The repair process 5.4 The whole failure/repair process 5.4.1 Component performance parameters 5.5 Calculating unconditional failure and repair intensities 5.5.1 Epected number of failures and repairs 5.5.2 Unavailability 5.6 Maintenance policies 5.7 Failure and repair distribution with non-constant hazard rates 5.7.1 Method 1 5.7.1 Method 2 5.8 Weibull analysis 5.8.1 Introduction 5.8.2 The Weibull distribution 5.8.3 Graphical analysis 5.8.4 Censored samples 5.8.5 Probability plotting 5.8.6 Hazard plotting 5.8.7 Standard deviation 5.9 Summary 5.10 References 5.11 Bibliography Chapter 6 Reliability Networks 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Simple network structures 6.2.1 Series networks 6.2.2 Parallel networks 6.2.3 Series/parallel combinations 6.2.4 Voting systems 6.2.5 Standby systems 6.3 Complex networks 6.3.1 Conditional probability approach 6.3.2 Star and delta configurations 6.4 Network failure modes 6.4.1 Minimal path sets using the connectivity matrix 6.4.2 Transform minimal path sets to minimal cut sets 6.5 Network quantification 6.5.1 Minimal cut set calculations 6.5.2 Minimal path set calculations 6.6 Summary 6.7 Bibliography Chapter 7 Fault Tree Analysis 7.1 The fault tree model 7.2 Examples of the use of fault tree symbols 7.3 Boolean representation of a fault tree 7.4 Component failure categories 7.4.1 Fault versus failures 7.4.2 Occurrence versus existence 7.4.3 Passive versus active components 7.5 Fault tree construction 7.5.1 System boundary specification 7.5.2 Basic rules for fault tree construction 7.6 Qualitative fault tree analysis 7.6.1 'Top-down' approach 7.6.2 'Bottom-up' approach 7.6.3 Computer algorithm 7.6.4 Minimal path sets and dual fault trees 7.7 Fault tree quantification 7.7.1 Top event probability 7.7.2 Top event failure intensity 7.7.3 Minimal cut set parameters 7.7.4 Calculating system unconditional failure intensity using initiator/enabler events 7.8 Importance measures 7.8.1 Deterministic measures 7.8.2 Probabilistic measures (systems availability) 7.8.3 Birnbaum's measure of importance 7.8.4 Criticality measure of importance 7.8.5 Fussell-Vesely measure of importance 7.8.6 Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set importance 7.8.7 Probabilistic measures (systems reliability) 7.8.8 Barlow-Proschan measure of initiator importance 7.8.9 Sequential contributory measure of enabler importance 7.8.10 Barlow-Proschan measure of minimal cut set importance 7.9 Expected number of system failures as a bound for systems unreliability 7.10 Use of system performance measures 7.11 Benefits to be gained from fault tree analysis 7.12 Summary 7.13 Bibliography Chapter 8 Common Cause Failures 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Common mode and common cause failures 8.2.1 Common mode cut sets 8.2.2 The beta factor method 8.3 Other common cause failure models 8.4 Choice of CCF model 8.4.1 Redundancy and diversity 8.4.2 System complexity 8.4.3 Defences against CCF 8.4.4 Unrevealed failures 8.5 Fault tree analysis with CCF 8.6 Summary 8.7 References Chapter 9 Maintainability 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Maintainability analysis 9.3 The maintainability model 9.4 Maintainability prediction 9.4.1 Field data analysis 9.5 MTTR synthesis 9.6 Summary 9.7 Reference Chapter 10 Markov Analysis 10.1 Introduction 10.1.1 Standby redundancy 10.1.2 Common causes 10.1.3 Secondary failures 10.1.4 Multiple-state component failure modes 10.2 Example - single-component failure/repair process 10.3 General Markov state transition model construction 10.4 Markov state equations 10.4.1 State equations 10.5 Dynamic solutions 10.6 Steady-state probabilities, 10.7 Standby systems 10.7.1 Hot standby 10.7.2 Cold standby 10.7.3 W arm standby 10.8 Reduced Markov diagrams 10.8.1 Steady-state solutions 10.9 General three-component system 10.10 Time duration in states 10.10.1 Frequency of encountering a state 10.11 Transient solutions 10.12 Reliability modelling 10.13 Summary 10.14 Bibliography Chapter 11 Simulation 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Uniform random numbers 11.3 Direct simulation method 11.4 Dagger sampling 11.5 Generation of event times from distributions 11.5.1 Exponential distribution 11.5.2 Weibull distribution 11.5.3 Normal distribution 11.6 System logic 11.7 System example 11.8 Terminating the simulation 11.9 Summary 11.10 Bibliography Chapter 12 Reliability Data Collection and Analysis 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Generic data 12.3 In-service reliability data 12.4 Data collection 12.4.1 General 12.4.2 Inventory data 12.4.3 Failure-event data 12.4.4 Operating time data 12.5 Data quality assurance 12.5.1 Quality plan 12.6 Reliability data analysis 12.6.1 General 12.6.2 Component reliability 12.6.3 Equipment reliability 12.6.4 System reliability 12.6.5 In-service data reliability 12.6.6 System level analysis 12.6.7 Equipment level analysis 12.6.8 Trend analysis 12.7 Generic reliability data analysis 12.7.1 Estimating equipment failure rates 12.7.2 Genenc reliability database 12.8 Summary 12.9 References Chapter 13 Risk Assessment 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Background 13.3 Major accident hazards 13.3.1 Explosions 13.3.2 Gas and dust explosions 13.3.3 Confined and unconfined vapour cloud explosions 13.3.4 Fires 13.3.5 Toxic releases 13.4 Major accident hazard risk assessments 13.4.1 Hazard identification 13.4.2 Consequence analysis 13.4.3 Estimating event probabilities 13.4.4 Risk evaluation 13.5 Risk-based inspection and maintenance 13.5.1 General 13.5.2 Risk-based inspection 13.5.3 Comparison of RBI and major accident hazard assessments 13.5.4 RBI assessment 13.5.5 API RBI assessment methodology 13.5.6 Experience with RBI 13.6 Summary 13.7 References Chapter 14 Case study 1 - Quantitative safety assessment of the ventilation recirculation system in an undersea mine 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Recirculation fan system description 14.3 Conditions for fan stoppage 14.3.1 Methane levels 14.3.2 Carbon monoxide levels 14.3.3 Recirculation factor 14.3.4 Additional monitoring 14.4 Scope of the analysis 14.5 System description 14.5.1 Section switch trip protection 14.6 Fault tree construction 14.6.1 Dormant or unrevealed system failure 14.6.2 Spurious or revealed system trip 14.7 Qualitative fault tree analysis of the system 14.7.1 Dormant or unrevealed system failure modes 14.7.2 Spurious or revealed system failure modes 14.8 Component failure and repair data 14.8.1 Component failure rate data 14.8.2 Carbon monoxide monitors 14.8.3 Pressure monitors 14.8.4 Methane monitors 14.8.5 Component repair data 14.9 Quantitative system analysis 14.9.1 System unavailability 14.9.2 Unconditional failure intensity 14.9.3 Spurious recirculation fan stoppages 14.10 Performance of the methane and carbon monoxide monitoring systems 14.11 Variations in system design and operation 14.11.1 Design changes 14.11.2 Inspection interval changes 14.11.3 Methane detection system 14.11.4 Carbon monoxide detection system 14.12 Conclusions Chapter 14 Case study 2 - Failure mode and effects criticality analysis of gas turbine system 14.13 Introduction 14.14 Gas turbine FMECA 14.15 Discussion 14.16 Summary Chapter 14 Case study 3 - In-service inspection of structural components (application to conditional maintenance of steam generators) 14.17 Introduction 14.18 Data needed for safety and maintenance objectives 14.19 The steam generator maintenance programme 14.20 Expected benefits of the probabilistic ISI base programme 14.21 Data for safety and data for maintenance 14.22 The probabilistic fracture mechanics model 14.23 Safety and maintenance-orientated results 14.23.1 Developing the preventive maintenance strategy 14.23.2 Evolution of the crack size distnbution with time 14.23.3 Determination of future leak and rupture risks 14.23.4 Determination of steam generator residual life - strategy for SG replacement 14.24 Sensitivity analysis 14.24.1 Comparison between probabilistic and deterministic models 14.24.2 Impact of plugging criteria - data for plant safety strategy 14.24.3 Influence of the rate of controlled tube inspections - data for maintenance strategy 14.25 Conclusions Chapter 14 Case study 4 - Business-interruption risk analysis 14.26 Introduction 14.27 Risk assessment 14.28 Combined-cycle plant assessment 14.29 Data and basic assumptions 14.30 Plant availability prediction 14.31 Risk estimation 14.32 Conclusions 14.33 References Appendix A Appendix B Glossary Index  |
